E-catalog        

Библиогр.: 17 назв.

Обсуждается аргумент Лейбница в пользу тезиса о том, что мы живем в наилучшем из всех возможных миров, а также контраргумент Шопенгауэра, утверждающего, что мы живем в наихудшем из всех возможных миров. Поднимается вопрос о том, удалось ли Шопенгауэру победить в заочной дискуссии. One of the key metaphysical questions is the question of the principle of the structure of the universe, and Leibniz’s theodicy and Schopenhauer’s pathodicy can be distinguished as extreme positions. According to their ideas, the world is arranged either in the best or the worst possible way. The problem of theodicy and evil in the world is being actualized in the context of modern discussions about free will and moral responsibility. In order to justify God, Leibniz argues that God does not desire evil at all, but only allows it without compromising his holiness. Evil cannot be the content of God’s prior will, but evil can be an indirect consequence of his will, when no greater good can be achieved by eliminating evil. Schopenhauer disputes Leibniz’s argument. He asserts that real suffering is never destroyed by future joys, because suffering fills its time as much as joy fills its own. Schopenhauer not only argues that the world is the best – he offers proof that our world is the worst. The vaunted perfections of the universe are only necessary conditions. They minimally support the existence of the world. Schopenhauer’s proof is not rigorous in nature, it is more a parody of Leibniz’s proof than an independent strictly verified logical construction. The question of whether Schopenhauer managed to win in the correspondence discussion with Leibniz cannot be answered unequivocally. On the one hand, Schopenhauer showed that the idea of the best of all possible worlds is utopian and poorly applicable to reality. He was not based on the axiom of the divine presence, and, because of this, his reasoning looks more relevant today. Schopenhauer’s argument about the worst possible world turned out to be in demand and gave rise to a discussion about pessimism at the end of the 19th century. On the other hand, Schopenhauer’s own proof from the point of view of logic and the theory of argumentation is much weaker than Leibniz’s proof. Schopenhauer’s proof does not agree with his own philosophy and looks like an artificial construction, while Leibniz’s proof fits neatly into his system. Schopenhauer’s criticism of Leibniz’s optimism may take place, but his own argument is even more sophistical. The actual world can be called both the best and the worst of all possible worlds. In this sense, Eduard von Hartmann’s version seems to be successful: the best world can be as bad as possible, but this does not contradict the fact that it is the best.