E-catalog        

Foreword to the Two-Volume Series -- Introduction to This Study -- Introduction to Part I: Basic Concepts and Approaches -- Chapter 1: The “Correct” Definition of “the Impact of a Choice on Economic Efficiency” -- Chapter 2: The Components of the Difference Between a Firm’s Price and Conventional Marginal Costs and the Intermediate Determinants of the Intensity of Quality-and-Variety-Increasing-Investment Competition -- Chapter 3: The Definitions of “Monopolizing Conduct,” “Attempts to Monopolize,” and “Exclusionary Abuses” -- Chapter 4: The Conduct-Coverage of, Tests of Legality Promulgated by, and Defenses (U.S. Spelling) or Defences (British Spelling) Recognized by U.S. Antitrust Law and E.C./E.U. Competition Law -- Chapter 5: The Categories of Economic-Efficiency Gains Whose Generation by Business Conduct Respectively Are and Are Not Relevant to the Conduct’s Antitrust Legality -- Chapter 6: The Inevitable Arbitrariness of Market Definitions and the Unjustifiability of Market-Oriented Antitrust Analyses -- Chapter 7: Economic and Antitrust Markets: Their Abstract Definition, Their Delimitability, and the Methods That Have Been Proposed and Used to Identify Concrete Exemplars -- Chapter 8: The Operational Definition of A Firm’s Monopoly Power, Oligopoly Power, and Total (Market) Power in a Given ARDEPPS -- Chapter 9: The Need to Analyze Separately the Monopolizing Character, “Abusiveness,” Competitive Impact, and Economic Efficiency of Business Choices -- Conclusion to Part I -- Introduction to Part II -- Chapter 10: Oligopolistic Conduct -- Chapter 11: Predatory Conduct.

This volume (1) defines the specific-anticompetitive-intent, lessening-competition, distorting-competition, and exploitative-abuse tests of illegality promulgated by U.S. and/or  E.U. antitrust law, (2) compares the efficiency defenses promulgated by U.S. and E.U. antitrust law, (3) compares the conduct-coverage of the various U.S. and E.U. antitrust laws, (4) defines price competition and quality-or-variety-increasing-investment (QV-investment) competition and explains why they should be analyzed separately, (5) defines the components of individualized-pricing and across-the-board-pricing sellers’ price minus marginal cost gaps and analyses each’s determinants, (6) defines the determinants of the intensity of QV-investment competition and explains how they determine that intensity, (7) demonstrates that definitions of both classical and antitrust markets are inevitably arbitrary, not just at their periphery but comprehensively, (8) criticizes the various protocols for market definition recommended/used by scholars, the U.S. antitrust agencies, the European Commission, and U.S. and E.U. courts, (9) explains that a firm’s economic (market) power or dominance depends on its power over both price and QV investment and demonstrates that, even if markets could be defined non-arbitrarily, a firm’s economic power could not be predicted from its market share, (10) articulates a definition of “oligopolistic conduct” that some economists have implicitly used–conduct whose perpetrator-perceived ex ante profitability depended critically on the perpetrator’s belief that its rivals’ responses would be affected by their belief that it could react to their responses, distinguishes two types of such conduct–contrived and natural–by whether it entails anticompetitive threats and/or offers, explains why this distinction is critical under U.S. but not E.U. antitrust law, analyzes the profitability of each kind of oligopolistic conduct, examines these analyses’ implications for each’s antitrust legality, and criticizes related U.S. and E.U. case-law and doctrine and scholarly positions (e.g., on the evidence that establishes the illegal oligopolistic character of pricing), and (11) executes parallel analyses of predatory conduct--e.g., criticizes various arguments for the inevitable unprofitability of predatory pricing, the various tests that economists/U.S. courts advocate using/use to determine whether pricing is predatory, and two analyses by economists of the conditions under which QV investment and systems rivalry are predatory and examines the conditions under which production-process research, plant-modernization, and long-term full-requirements contracts are predatory.