Free will, action and responsibility: philosophical and legal analysis A. B. Didikin
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ArticleOther title: Свобода воли, действие и ответственность: философский и правовой анализ [Parallel title]Subject(s): Райл, Гилберт 1900-1976 | аналитическая философия права | свобода воли | действия | ответственность | нейронаука | логический бихевиоризмGenre/Form: статьи в журналах Online resources: Click here to access online
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Вестник Томского государственного университета. Философия. Социология. Политология № 48. С. 186-192Abstract: The paper provides an analysis of the main approaches to the interpretation of volitional actions in analytical legal philosophy, in the context of legal responsibility and discussions about free will. The most famous examples of the possibility of applying the neuroscience ar-guments in legal philosophy, in particular when assessing the effect of a volitional act performed consciously on human behavior, are considered. The paper argues that the philosophical argumentation in Gilbert Ryle’s logical behaviorism can be used as a rational approach to refute neuroscience data and interpret actions correctly, in terms of legal language.
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The paper provides an analysis of the main approaches to the interpretation of volitional actions in analytical legal philosophy, in the context of legal responsibility and discussions about free will. The most famous examples of the possibility of applying the neuroscience ar-guments in legal philosophy, in particular when assessing the effect of a volitional act performed consciously on human behavior, are considered. The paper argues that the philosophical argumentation in Gilbert Ryle’s logical behaviorism can be used as a rational approach to refute neuroscience data and interpret actions correctly, in terms of legal language.
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